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AbstrAct
The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)1 provides for the foundation of  the international regime to fi-
ght against climate change. But it is widely acknowledged that it is neither 
efficient nor sufficient to tackle this challenge. As from 2000, a proliferation 
of  policy initiatives outside this international climate regime has progressi-
vely questioned the centrality of  the international governance on climate 
change as laid down by the UNFCCC. Climate talks under the auspices of  
the UNFCCC for the adoption of  a new accord in Paris in December 2015 
at the 21st Conference of  the Parties to the UNFCCC provided a unique 
opportunity to rethink the role and structure of  the international climate 
regime within its own boundaries. In order to increase the level of  ambition 
of  climate action as soon as possible and in the future, it was of  crucial 
importance to design the Paris Accord in a way that it could be complemen-
ted and enhanced through synergies with other initiatives, which may be 
developed in other fora of  international cooperation. This article analyses 
the role the Paris Agreement could play in achieving the defragmentation of  
the international governance on climate change, which could contribute to 
enhancing new cooperation dynamics, and to building a (more) consistent 
global climate law.
Keywords: Climate change, Paris agreement, defragmentation
resumo 
A Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre Mudanças Climáticas de 1992 
(UNFCCC) prevê a base do regime internacional para combater as mudan-
ças climáticas. No entanto, é amplamente reconhecido que não é nem efi-
ciente nem suficiente para enfrentar esse desafio. A partir de 2000, uma 
1  UNITED Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations Treaty 
Series, New York, v. 1771, n. 7, p. 107, 9 May 1992. 
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proliferação de iniciativas políticas fora deste regime 
climático internacional questionou progressivamente a 
centralidade da governança internacional sobre mudan-
ças climáticas conforme estabelecido pela UNFCCC. 
Os debates referentes ao clima sob os auspícios da 
UNFCCC para a adoção de um novo acordo em Paris 
em dezembro de 2015 na 21ª Conferência das Partes 
da UNFCCC proporcionaram uma oportunidade única 
para repensar o papel e a estrutura do regime climático 
internacional dentro de seus próprios limites. A fim de 
aumentar o nível de ambição da ação climática o mais 
rápido possível, era de importância crucial projetar o 
Acordo de Paris de forma a ser complementado e apri-
morado por meio de sinergias com outras iniciativas, 
que podem ser desenvolvidas em outros fóruns de coo-
peração internacional. Este artigo analisa o papel que 
o Acordo de Paris poderia desempenhar na realização 
da desfragmentação da governança internacional sobre 
mudanças climáticas, o que poderia contribuir para apri-
morar novas dinâmicas de cooperação e para construir 
uma lei climática global (mais) consistente.
1. introduction
Climate change is a highly complex policy challenge. 
Its causes cut across all economic sectors. Solutions re-
quire many different kind of  policies in energy, infras-
tructure, finance and innovation, to name just a few. At 
the international level, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is widely 
seen as the central pillar of  a broader ‘regime complex’, 
encompassing a number of  formal and informal inter-
national policy processes. 
Negotiations on a new climate agreement should be 
concluded under the UNFCCC by the end of  2015 in 
Paris.2 Many countries expected these negotiations to 
produce a durable, legal agreement, which can structu-
re climate cooperation in the long-term. But, regarding 
their difficulties to found a consensus, the Durban Pla-
tform gave birth to an a minima agreement in which the 
collective effort is the result of  the aggregation of  “na-
tionally determined” contributions. The Parties themselves 
establish their contribution’s level of  ambition, at a na-
tional level, keeping in mind the collective objective of  
2  UNFCCC. Decision 1/CP.17 2011: Establishment of  an Ad Hoc 
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action.
holding global warming well under 2°C. The COP will 
likely provide further guidance to the States as to how 
they determine their contribution3, but until now there 
has been no burden sharing of  the implementation of  
this collective objective, as it had been the case pursuant 
to the Kyoto Protocol and in particular as between the 
fifteen countries of  the European Union at the time, 
who had allocated between themselves a common ob-
jective of  reducing their emissions by 8%4. The objecti-
ve of  holding temperatures laid down in the Agreement 
is however completely unrealistic based on our emis-
sions’ trajectories. This is established on an annual basis 
by the United Nations Environment programme in its 
report entitled The Emissions Gap, released before each 
COP. This report analyses the gap in terms of  ambition 
until 20205. Several studies have also analysed the aggre-
gate effect of  States’ national contributions prior to the 
COP 21, including a study commissioned pursuant to 
the UNFCCC for 31 October 20146. It concluded that, 
combined altogether, these contributions do not take us 
towards 2°, even less 1.5°, but rather, according to esti-
mates, towards 3 or 3.5°C. This is undoubtedly progress 
compared to the 4 or 5 °C expected by so-called “busi-
ness-as-usual” scenarios. Even though today 191 Parties 
representing 98% of  global emissions have submitted 
their national contribution, we are still very far from the 
objective set out in the Paris Agreement and, beyond 
that, from the safe operating space of  our planet7. 
Thus, to improve the level of  ambition now and in 
the future, it is fundamental that the Paris agreement 
could be supplemented or even fuelled by other ini-
3  CCNUCC, Secretariat, Parties’ views regarding further guidance 
in relation to the mitigation section of  decision 1/CP.21, FCCC/
APA/2016/INF.1, 7 October 2016, add. 1, 18 October 2016.
4  This burden sharing was carried out by applying a basket of  cri-
teria established by the Utrecht University, based on the population, 
growth and energetic efficiency as well as opportunity or more po-
litical considerations. Phylipsen, G. et al. a triptych sectoral approach 
to burden differentiation: GHG emissions in the European bubble. 
Energy Policy, n. 26, p. 929-943, 1998.
5  See UNEP. The Emissions Gap Report 2015: summary for poli-
cymakers. Available at: <http://uneplive.unep.org/media/docs/
theme/13/EGR2015ESEnglishEmbargoed.pdf>, 
6  Synthesis report on the aggregate effect of  the intended na-
tionally determined contributions, Note by the secretariat, FCCC/
CP/2015/7, 30 October 2015, 66 p. The Paris Decision takes note 
thereof  (§16). 
7  UNEP. UNFCCC Secretariat, Aggregate effect of  the intended 
nationally determined contributions: an update, Synthesis report by 
the secretariat. FCCC/CP, n. 2, May 2016; Steffen, W. et al. Plane-
tary Boundaries: Guiding human development on a changing planet. 
Science, v. 347, n. 6223, p. 1, 13 Feb. 2015.
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tiatives, actions and policies, coming from other fora 
of  international cooperation. This raises the question: 
what can the new agreement do in order to better forge 
effective synergies within the different elements of  the 
climate regime, and to manage potential frictions? In 
a fragmented legal landscape (2), the Paris Agreement 
gives some new leverage tools for achieving the defrag-
mentation of  the international climate governance (3).
2.  from A frAgmented governAnce 
lAndscApe to regime complexes 
The issue of  fragmentation has gained more weight 
in recent times, as researchers and policy makers realise 
the complexity of  climate change, and search for effec-
tive solutions. We can highlight three central reasons 
why the climate regime has long displayed this degree 
of  fragmentation.
First, as mentioned above, climate change is a high 
complex, multi-sector, multi-scale problem. Addressing it 
effectively requires coordinated policy responses in many 
domains. Ongoing work by the OECD, for example, as-
sesses the multiple policy response required at the natio-
nal level from different sectoral policy processes: from 
energy policy, trade and competition policy, innovation 
policy, infrastructure planning, and financial regulation. 
The same principle holds at the international level. An 
effective response to climate change will inevitably requi-
re a complex, multifaceted response, combining the ex-
pertise and mandates of  different policy processes. 
Secondly, there has also been in the past a divergen-
ce of  views between countries and researchers regar-
ding appropriate processes. This has been particular 
manifest in the debate about multilateral versus mini-
-lateral approaches to international coordination. Today 
it is probably fair to say that this conflict is perhaps less 
fundamental, and that a majority of  experts and policy 
makers see multilateral and mini-lateral as complemen-
tary. This can be seen in the so-called Workstream 2 
process under the UNFCCC and the Lima-Paris Action 
Agenda, which aims to catalyse a range of  International 
Cooperative Initiatives.8 It is therefore being increasin-
gly recognized that the UNFCCC is a core aspect of  the 
global climate regime, but insufficient by itself. 
8  UNFCCC. Decision 1/CP.20 2014: Lima call for climate action.
Thirdly, international law is, by definition, a frag-
mented regime. Fragmentation arises logically from the 
principle of  ‘autonomy of  treaties’, according to whi-
ch every treaty is independent of  all other treaties. The 
fragmentation of  the international legal order is even 
increasing, due to the twofold movement of  expansion 
and diversification of  international law.9 The situation 
is even worse in international environmental law, wi-
thout a global environmental organization supervizing 
or even unifying the hundreds of  autonomous institu-
tional arrangements existing.10 In international law, “nor-
mative conflict is endemic to international law” as stated by an 
International Law Commission’s report.11 
The UNFCCC forms, of  itself, already a fairly com-
plex legal regime. The Convention, the Kyoto Proto-
col, the Cancun Accords and now the Paris agreement 
all represent significant albeit distinct developments of  
the climate regime. Nonetheless, overall the UNFCCC 
regime represents a relatively cohesive whole. In the 
past, it can be argued that the sharing of  the workload 
between the UNFCCC and institutions like the Inter-
national Maritime Organization, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization, the World Trade Organization, 
or the Montreal Protocol or the Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity have not been fully synergistic.  
But it should be noted that fragmentation is not ne-
cessarily prejudicial. What matters is the effectiveness 
of  the policy response, and in the past it seems relati-
vely clear that the lack of  better coordination has hin-
dered the policy response. Regarding its relationships 
with other regimes or policy spaces, the climate regi-
me has proven to be naturally closed and loosely in-
teracting. Indeed, Parties has been quite indifferent, or 
even hermetic to what occured elsewhere, regarding the 
consequences of  their action or inaction on other envi-
ronmental regimes and initiatives, as well as the conse-
quences on other regimes and initiatives on their action 
within the climate regime. Despite the openness of  the 
9  ICD. Fragmentation of  International Law : Difficulties arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of  International Law. Report 
of  the Study Group of  the International Law Commission, A/CN.4/L.702, 
UNO, 28 July 2006.
10  Churchill, Robin R.; Ulfstein, Geir. Autonomous Institutional 
arrangements in multilateral environmental agreements : a little no-
tice phenomenom. American Journal of  International Law, p. 623, Oct. 
2000. 
11  ICD, Fragmentation of  International Law : Difficulties arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of  International Law. Report 
of  the Study Group of  the International Law Commission Finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, § 486, 13 Apr. 2006. 
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‘constitutional’ framework, the later has in general func-
tioned in a kind of  “clinical isolation”12 from other parts 
of  international law.  For example, measures adopted to 
implement the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol have 
shown that Parties have had so far little consideration 
of  biodiversity conservation issues, with some very few 
exceptions in relation to forest and land use manage-
ment, but always as ancillary consequences of  climate 
mitigation or adaptation objectives.13 
International climate change governance consists 
of  a ‘regime complex’ rather than just a single regime14 
of  norms and institutions under the 1992 UN Climate 
Change Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and now the 
Paris Agreement. Raustiala and Victor identified a regi-
me complex as “an array of  partially overlapping and non-hie-
rarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area”.15 The 
figure 1 bellow is adapted from the one that Kehoane 
and Victor proposed of  the international regime com-
plex for climate change. 
Figure 1 - Adapted from The regime complex for ma-
naging climate change
Source:  Keohane, R. O.; Victor, D. G. The regime 
complex for climate change. Perspectives on Politics, v. 9, 
p. 7-23, 2011.
As well as the UNFCCC, the complex includes nu-
12  WTO Appelate Body Report, United States - Standards for Refor-
mulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 29.04.1996, p. 19.
13  Maljean-Dubois Sandrine, Wemaëre Matthieu. Climate Change 
and Biodiversity. In : Encyclopedia of  Environmental Law - Biodiversity 
and Nature Protection Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, ed. Jona Raz-
zaque et Elisa Morgera, 2016. pp. 295-308.
14  On regimes, Krasner S. Structural causes and regime conse-
quences: regimes as intervening variables, International Organization, 
vol. 36, n°2, pp. 1-21. 1982.
15  Raustiala K., Victor D. The regime complex for plant genetic 
ressources, International Organization, vol. 58, pp. 277-309. 2004.
merous public and private institutions and initiatives 
which operate at the international, regional, bilateral, 
national and even subnational level, each with its own 
focus (for example, expertise with the IPCC, finance, 
technology, business…) and involving varying levels of  
commitment. The interactions between these different 
spheres vary both in their strength, and in whether they 
are intended or accidental. Orsini, Morin and Young la-
ter gave regime complexes the more precise, practical 
and operational meaning of  “a network of  three or more in-
ternational regimes that relate to a common subject matter; exhi-
bit overlapping membership; and generate substantive, normative, 
or operative interactions recognized as potentially problematic whe-
ther or not they are essential in identifying regime complexes and 
analyzing their effects”.16 
After years of  an abundant scholarship on the frag-
mentation of  international law, this concept of  regime 
complex has the advantage of  highlighting that which 
links the different regimes together as much as that whi-
ch divides them. Hence it offers an interesting analytical 
framework for understanding accurately a complex rea-
lity by focusing on the flow of  both norms and actors 
which exist between the different legal and institutional 
realms. It therefore takes us further forward than the 
simple, well-established and relatively unhelpful obser-
vation that regime fragmentation exists, and towards a 
greater understanding of  the relationships and interac-
tions between these regimes. 
From this perspective, we propose to view the Pa-
ris Accord as the bedrock of  the regime complex for 
climate change. Otherwise the Accord and the whole 
regime complex are likely to be ineffective. To this end, 
the Accord should aim to fulfil two different but com-
plementary objectives:
- on the one hand, a catalysing role to create a dy-
namic and contribute to raising the level of  ambition in 
the other regimes that form part of  the regime complex;
- on the other hand, to play the leading role in order 
to orchestrate climate governance, to strengthen cohe-
rence and ensure complementarity, ensure work is cove-
red correctly and avoid duplication of  effort etc. 
16  A. Orsini, J.-F; Morin, O. Young. Regime complexes: a buzz, a 
boom, or a boost for global governance? Global Governance: A Review 
of  Multilateralism and International Organizations, v. 19, n. 1, p. 29, 2013.
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3. the pAris Agreement As the bedrock of 
the ‘regime complex’ on climAte chAnge
The COP Decision 1/CP.21, adopting the Paris 
Agreement at COP21, provides for several indicators 
towards a greater openness to external challenges than 
in the past. They acknowledge the need for a global 
approach to such challenges, which goes beyond the 
forum of  meetings of  Contracting Parties to the Paris 
Agreement, the climate COPs.
Depending on subjects, bridges have been built in 
two directions: either the Agreement takes into consi-
deration other objectives or requirements, or it invites 
Parties or intergovernmental organisations to integrate 
better the climate change dimension. In its preamble, 
the Agreement refers to the need to ensure “the integrity 
of  all ecosystems, including oceans, and the protection of  biodi-
versity, recognized by some cultures as Mother Earth”, while 
recognizing the importance of  “the conservation and enhan-
cement, as appropriate, of  sinks and reservoirs of  the greenhouse 
gases referred to in the Convention”. 
Regarding forests and sinks, it underlines “the impor-
tance of  incentivizing, as appropriate, non-carbon benefits asso-
ciated with such approaches” (art. 5). Such references could 
improve the coverage of  biodiversity protection in the 
climate change framework which has been so far rather 
hermetic in that respect.
The preamble of  the COP Decision 1/CP.21 also 
makes a reference to the Sustainable Development 
Goals, in particular to the SDG 13 on climate chan-
ge as well as to Addis-Abeba Action Agenda adopted 
at the United Nations Third International Conference 
on Financing for Development and even to the Sendei 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Indeed, it is 
crucial to create greater consistency among these glo-
bal objectives at the international level. The reference 
to such “meta-norms” could play a key role in streng-
thening the regime complex on international climate 
change and linking efforts under the UNFCCC with 
others in the international environmental and develo-
pment law arena. It assists in linking the work under 
the Convention with relevant regimes, environmental 
and other, to the benefit of  each of  those regimes. Cru-
cially, it will guide Parties’ in their implementation of  
the Paris Accord so that it is consistent with those other 
regimes, thus enhancing international legal coherence 
and reducing fragmentation. The synergistic role of  the 
Aichi Targets in the field of  biodiversity protection has 
already been pointed out.17 Developing commonalities 
between regimes through common principles or stra-
tegic objectives could help to prevent conflict between 
multilateral environmental agreements.
A link is also established between climate chan-
ge and human rights, not in the operative part of  the 
Agreement as initially proposed by some Parties, but in 
the preamble of  the Accord, which emphasizes that “cli-
mate change is a common concern of  humankind, Parties should, 
when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote 
and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right 
to health, the rights of  indigenous peoples, local communities, mi-
grants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable 
situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, 
empowerment of  women and intergenerational equity”.18 Howe-
ver, this relates to the respect of  “respective obligations” of  
States (existing or to be adopted in another context) : 
with such qualifier, some wanted to make sure that the 
Paris Accord would not create new obligations in this 
area. 
On indigenous people, it must be noted that the 
Paris Accord also mentions the need to take into ac-
count traditional knowledge, knowledge of  indigenous 
peoples and local knowledge systems, with a view to 
integrating adaptation into relevant policies and actions 
(art. 7, § 5). Noteworthy that indigenous people have 
welcomed the recognition of  the ambitious objective 
to pursue efforts to limit temperature increase to 1,5° C 
as compared to pre-industrial levels in Article 2 of  the 
Paris Agreement. However, stating that climate change 
is a “common concern of  humankind” is not new, in as far 
as it was already affirmed by the preamble UNFCCC 
since 1992.
On finance, there has also been an effort towards 
greater consistency: the COP Decision “Invites all relevant 
United Nations agencies and international, regional and national 
financial institutions to provide information to Parties through 
the secretariat on how their development assistance and climate 
finance programmes incorporate climate-proofing and climate re-
silience measures” (§ 44). In doing so, the Agreement as-
sumes to become the core framework and a catalyst of  
17  Futhazar, G. The diffusion of  the Strategic Plan for Biodiver-
sity and its Aichi targets within the biodiversity cluster: an illustra-
tion of  current trends in the global governance of  biodiversity and 
ecosystems. YIEL, v. 25, n. 1, p. 133–166, 2015.
18  We can find a similar formula in the preamble of  the Paris 
Decision.  
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the strengthened international cooperation on climate 
change, in and out the UNFCCC.19
By contrast, there is no reference made in the Pa-
ris Agreement to international trade law or agreements. 
Initially proposed as an option in the Geneva text, it has 
been withdrawn and not tabled again in the final rounds 
of  talks before COP21. Therefore, the statu quo should 
remain, with a relative deference from the international 
climate regime with regard to international trade law.20 
Having in mind how much international trade law, par-
ticularly intellectual property rights, can affect its imple-
mentation, the Paris Agreement could have integrated, 
at least, a clause reflecting upon the mutual supportive-
ness principle. This principle requires consideration of  
whether there are areas of  conflict given that the Parties 
are required to interpret and apply the rules emanating 
from the two different legal regimes in a way that is 
mutually compatible. It is therefore a principle that ena-
bles the different regimes to be linked and coordinated 
whilst avoiding a hierarchy. According to the Internatio-
nal Legal Commission, “The assumption is that conflicts may 
and should be resolved between the treaty partners as they arise 
and with a view to mutual accommodation”.21 
A reference to mutual supportiveness in the Paris 
Accord would have been helpful to the world of  interna-
tional business by providing a more balanced approach 
to the relationship between climate change and business 
than is currently the case. In terms of  its environmental 
and commercial objectives, the Paris Agreement should 
not be subservient to international commercial law. 
More generally, it would have been beneficial to promo-
te the principle of  mutual supportiveness in the Paris 
Accord with a fairly general formulation that takes the 
mutual supportiveness principle out of  its usual applica-
tion specifically to international trade law.
The Paris Accord could have been inspired by the 
relatively balanced formulation contained in the Legal 
principles adopted in 2014 by the International Law 
Association. Article 10 entitled “Inter-Relationships” is 
19  See Abbott, kenneth W. et al. International Organizations as Or-
chestrators. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
20  See Maljean-Dubois, Sandrine; Wemaëre, Matthieu. L’accord 
à conclure à Paris en décembre 2015: une opportunité pour 
‘dé’fragmenter la gouvernance internationale du climat ? Revue ju-
ridique de l’environnement, v. 4, p. 657, 2015.
21  ICD. Fragmentation of  International Law : Difficulties arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of  International Law. Report 
of  the Study Group of  the International Law Commission Finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 Apr. 2006, §276.
expressed thus:
 “1. In order to effectively address climate change and its ad-
verse effects, States shall formulate, elaborate and implement in-
ternational law relating to climate change in a mutually supportive 
manner with other relevant international law.
2. States in cooperation with relevant international organi-
zations shall ensure that consideration of  climate mitigation and 
adaptation will be integrated into their law, policies and actions at 
all relevant levels, as laid out in Article 3. 
3. According to Article 8, States shall cooperate with each 
other to implement the inter-relationship principle in all areas of  
international law, whenever necessary [...]”22.
Given that it represents a compromise, mutual su-
pportiveness should have been a politically acceptable 
option and would have benefited the other areas of  
international environmental cooperation (in particular 
on ozone layer protection or biological diversity where 
there has already been some friction) and also more wi-
dely to the trade, investment, law of  the sea and human 
rights domains. The clause proposed by the ILA is par-
ticularly interesting because it is balanced in aiming to 
take into account other areas of  law in the drafting and 
implementation of  climate law (§1), it also provides a 
principle of  integration of  climate demands into other 
policy areas at all relevant levels (§2) and provides, if  ne-
cessary, for cooperation on the implementation of  the 
principle of  internormativity (§3). In this way, such a 
clause could enable secondary legislation (for example, 
previous COP decisions relating to the Paris Accord) 
to guide the implementation of  the Accord in a direc-
tion which takes account of  other normative areas in an 
evolutionary way. Such a clause could also inspire other 
normative areas to take better account of  the relevant 
targets in the Paris Accord in a spirit of  “win-win”.
To take the example of  biodiversity, procedures 
and modalities for “Intended Nationaly Determined 
Contributions”23 implementation could be used to au-
thorise the COP to recommend to Parties that they take 
into account the need to protect biodiversity, with refe-
rence to decisions under the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) that relate to certain objectives, means 
or indicators. Combined with the principle of  “no ba-
22  ILA. Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change Draft Article. 2014. 
Available at: <http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/
cid/1029>.
23  UNFCC, Decision 1/CP.19 (2013), Further advancing the 
Durban Platform.
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cksliding”, such an initiative could produce a domino 
effect on biodiversity conversation (whose positive 
effects on climate change mitigation and adaptation are 
already well-known). Clearly, the level of  resistance that 
can be expected from some Parties to such an initiative 
should not be under-estimated. This resistance origina-
tes from a fear that discussions within the CBD could 
be “contaminated” through the “importation” of  diffi-
culties and structural issues from the UNFCCC. It also 
stems from a fear of  losing sovereignty by “importing” 
concepts and rules that emanate from the UNFCCC, 
also remembering that some important Parties such as 
the US are not parties to the CBD. It may also be worth 
thinking about the need for better coordinated action 
with the Montreal Protocol for example on the elimi-
nation of  HFCs. This shows particularly well the need 
of  coordination between two international regimes, in 
that case the climate regime and the ozone regime. The 
increasing use of  HFCs is a climate issue, complicated 
by the international policy aiming to protect the ozone 
layer. It is exactly at the interface of  the two regimes. 
There is not a single word on that in the Paris Agree-
ment. The issue has been given only marginal conside-
ration on the road to Paris, as an opportunity to mitigate 
climate change. However, the Paris Agreement created 
the momentum which has favoured the adoption of  an 
agreement during the Kigali Meeting of  the Parties to 
the Montreal Protocol, in October 201624. The Kigali 
amendment will guarantee a better consistency of  inter-
nation action in favour of   climate and ozone.
By promoting voluntary cooperative approaches in 
its Article 6, the Paris Agreement offers also multiple 
benefits, both by enhancing the implementation of  the 
climate and other international regimes, and by inspi-
ring and providing good examples to other Parties whi-
ch could in turn result in an acceleration of  the global 
effort under the Convention. Given the difficulty in 
making substantial progress involving all Parties, enhan-
ced cooperative action could be a key way of  enhancing 
not just the implementation of  work under the Conven-
tion, but also under other regimes by promoting syner-
gies with the Convention, and thus reducing fragmenta-
tion in the realm of  international law. 
24  Available at: <http://www.unep.org/africa/news/kigali-
amendment-montreal-protocol-another-global-commitment-stop-
climate-change>. 
4. finAl conclusions
 In recent years, other important environmental is-
sues as forests, biodiversity, ozone, marine acidification, 
and so on, have in most cases been overshadowed by the 
issue of  human-induced climate change, yet both are 
equally important, if  not fundamental to the ongoing 
future of  human populations and even planetary life. 
Indeed planetary boundaries are closely connected and 
this should be duly reflected in policies and legal tools25. 
As shown by the lack of  cross-reference in decisions 
taken in the context of  the international climate change 
regime, the UNFCCC behaved sometimes like an au-
tistic convention hermetic to external concerns. Accor-
ding to some authors, “the connection with issues other than 
its own has been seen as an unwanted distraction to achieving its 
narrowly defined and interpreted object and purpose”.26 COP21 
has provided an unic opportunity to make a decisive 
step toward a better open approach of  other issues and 
regimes. The Paris Agreement shows timid progress 
from this point of  view and States have now to assume 
their responsibilities. Who can claim today in good fai-
th that the international climate regime could solve on 
its own the issue of  climate change? Indeed the natural 
fragmentation of  international law allows States to ins-
trumentalize one policy space against another in order 
to protect their domestic interests, thereby undermining 
overall effectiveness in the end.27 Here, the “schism of  
reality” that Amy Dahan and Stefan Aykut pointed out, 
seems particularly relevant and is problematic. It is the 
result of  a growing gap between a given reality of  the 
world based on the globalization of  markets and the 
overexploitation of  fossil fuels, with States being priso-
ners of  a fierce competition who hang on as ever their 
national sovereignty on the one hand and a negotiating 
forum supported by international governance arrange-
ments which gives the impression it can be a central re-
gulator being capable of  allocating emission rights, but 
with less and less grip on this given reality.28 Scholars 
25  Biermann, F. Planetary boundaries and earth system govern-
ance: exploring the links. Ecological Economics, v. 81, p. 4. 2012.
26  Chambers, W. B. Interlinkages and the Effectiveness of  Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 
2008.
27  Doelle, M. Re-thinking the Role of  the UN Climate Regime. 5 March 
2015. Available at: <https://blogs.dal.ca/melaw/2015/03/15/re-
thinking-the-role-of-the-un-climate-regime/>. Ostrom, Voir aussi E. 
Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global En-
vironmental Change. Global Environmental Change, v. 20, p. 550, 2010. 
28  Dalmedico, A. Dahan; Aykut, S. Gouverner le climat, 20 ans de négo-
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have definitely to pay more attention for the coming 
years both to interplays between the international regi-
mes29 but also to the management of  regime complexity 
at the national level.30 
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